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The Use of Suppression Hearing
Testimony to Impeach
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided in Simmons v. United States "that
when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection."' Since
the Simmons decision, a major point of controversy has been whether the
shield created by Simmons is broad enough to prohibit the use of the defen-
dant's suppression hearing testimony to impeach the defendant who later
testifies inconsistently at trial. Although in 1980 the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to clarify the Simmons rule in United States v. Salvucci,2 the
Court chose not to consider this issue.3
The precise extent of protection the Simmons rule provides a defendant
who testifies at a suppression hearing remains an open question. It is evident
that there is confusion among different courts as to whether the Simmons
rule excludes the use of suppression hearing testimony for impeachment pur-
poses. Some courts view Simmons as not applying to impeachment, and per-
mit suppression hearing testimony to be used." In contrast, other courts view
Simmons as not providing sufficient protection against the use of suppression
hearing testimony, and have created their own rules precluding its use.5 Still
other courts have yet to decide whether Simmons precludes the use of sup-
pression hearing testimony for impeachment.6
1. 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
2. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
3. Id. at 94.
4. People v. Smith, 67 I11. App. 3d 952, 385 N.E.2d 707 (1979) (dicta) (if a defendant chooses
to testify, suppression hearing testimony otherwise protected by Simmons can be used to im-
peach him); People v. Sturgis, 58 111. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1947) (testimony or documents
attested to by a defendant during a motion to suppress are available to the state for impeach-
ment purposes if a defendant chooses to testify); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 403 A.2d
853 (1979) (nothing in Simmons precludes the use of suppression hearing testimony for impeach-
ment purposes).
5. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). Simpson argues that "state
courts have the power to interpret their state constitutional provisions as more protective of
individual rights than parallel provisions of the United States Constitution." Id. at 177. The
court decided as a result of the Salvucci Court's interpretation of Simmons discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 46-67, that Simmons was not sufficient protection against self-
incrimination. Id. at 180. See also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 96 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); People v. Sturgis, 58 II1. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1974) (Goldenhersh,
J., dissenting).
6. Pendergrast v. United States, 416 F.2d 776, 780 n.13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
926 (1969) ("we express no opinion as to whether appellant's hearing testimony could have
been used at trial for purposes of impeachment."); Duddles v. United States, 399 A.2d 59, 63-64
n.1 ! (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) (dicta) (recognizing that the impeachment issue has not been resolved
by the courts, but stating it was an issue they were not going to decide).
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One purpose of this Note is to delineate the parameters of the Simmons
rule. In doing so, this Note reviews the process involved in making a motion
to suppress illegally seized evidence and analyzes. the case law formulating
the requirement of standing to assert a fourth amendment claim. This analysis
reveals that the "dilemma" 7 supposedly cured by Simmons of having to choose
between exercising a fourth amendment right and protecting against self-
incrimination remains a dilemma for the defendant who wants to testify at
both a suppression hearing and at his trial.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court has compounded the confusion
by giving inconsistent signals in the recent Salvucci decision. The Court should
eliminate this confusion by deciding whether the use of supression hearing
testimony to impeach a defendant forces him to make a constitutionally im-
permissible "choice" 8 between his fourth and fifth amendment rights. One
appropriate way to decide whether this choice is permissible is to examine
other situations that require a person to choose between constitutional rights.
By considering situations analogous to the impeachment issue, this Note iden-
tifies the competing personal and state interests which a court should con-
sider in its decision-making process.
This Note then examines the analytical trap into which the Burger Court
fell in failing to deal decisively with the impeachment issue in Salvucci. It
is demonstrated that the probative value of using suppression hearing testimony
to impeach a defendant at trial does not outweigh its prejudicial effect. A
proper analysis of the situation in which a defendant must choose between
asserting a fourth amendment claim and asserting a right against self-
incrimination when suppression hearing testimony can be used to impeach
shows that such a choice between rights is constitutionally impermissible.
THE PROTECTION OF SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY
Jones, Simmons and Salvucci
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure9 provides a method
for protecting against the admission of illegally seized evidence. The use of
41(e) is triggered by a motion raised by the aggrieved party of an illegal search
7. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
8. For lack of a better word, "choice" will be used throughout this Note in connection
with the intercourse between a defendant and his exercise of one of two constitutional rights.
"Choice," in this context, does not meet the definitional criteria of the word; what lacks is
a sense of voluntariness in the selection of two or more things. See generally WEBSTER's NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473 (2d ed. 1957). While there is an option between two constitu-
tional rights, the selection is a forced one. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e):
Motions for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized
for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession
of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the
property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing
[Vol. 59:295
SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY
or seizure.'" An unsupported motion will not be sustained." Generally, the
moving party must prove that the search was illegal,' 2 with the judge receiv-
ing evidence regarding any issue of fact related to the motion.' 3 The movant
carries the burden of persuasion, and must overcome a presumption of legality
of the search on the part of law enforcement officials."'
One requirement in a 41(e) motion is that the movant be the aggrieved
party;' 5 that is, he must have standing to assert a fourth amendment violation.' 6
In attempting to establish standing on a 41(e) motion or under an equivalent
state criminal procedure rule, a defendant can encounter a serious problem.
Traditionally, to challenge the constitutionality of a search and seizure an
aggrieved party had to assert ownership or interest in the seized property.'
7
In doing so, the party often had to waive his privilege against
self-incrimination.'0 If he tried to protect against self-incrimination, however,
the party then waived his fourth amendment right to contest an alleged illegal
violation of his privacy.' 9
or trial. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in
the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated
also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
10. Id.
11. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2, at 496 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (quoting A.
AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES
§ 252 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVEl.
12. 8B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.23, at 301-02 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].
13. See supra note 9. See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
675, at 780 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
14. Mascolo, The Use at Trial of Suppression Hearing Admissions: An Erosion of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 72 DICK. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1967). E.g., Duddles v. United
States, 399 A.2d 59, 63 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("defendant has burden of making a prima
facie showing of illegality and demonstrating a causal connection between the illegality and
the seized evidence."). The initial burden does shift to the government, however, if the search
is made without a warrant in a situation where one is necessary. LAFAVE, supra note 11, §
11.2, at 499.
15. See supra note 9.
16. For a general discussion of standing to assert a fourth amendment violation, see LAFAVE,
supra note 11, § 11.3, at 543; MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 179 (2d
ed. & Supp. 1978); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 333 (1970).
17. See Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv.
471, 472-80 (1952).
18. Id. at 486-87.
19. Id. This problem was best stated by Learned Hand in Connally v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1932):
The petition is a pleading; it must squarely allege some violation of the petitioner's
rights; else he has no standing. Perhaps he may mend his hold while the proceeding
is in progress; perhaps he may accept as true what is alleged against him and go
on; but nothing short of that is enough. The difference is substantial. Men may
wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband prop-
erty; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils
of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must
take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners
at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn
of the dilemma.
Id. at 630.
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In 1960, the Supreme Court first dealt with this dilemma in Jones v. United
States.2" In Jones, the Court was concerned with a defendant who moved
to suppress illegally seized evidence taken from his apartment." The govern-
ment took the position that the defendant had no standing because he did
not claim ownership of the seized items or an interest in the apartment.22
The district court agreed with the government and denied the defendant's
motion.23 In reversing, the Supreme Court recognized the defendant's dilemma
and noted that:
[S]ince narcotics charges like these in the present indictment may be
established through proof solely of possession of narcotics, a defendant
seeking to comply with what has been the conventional standing require-
ment hag been forced to allege facts the proof of which would tend, if
indeed not be sufficient, to convict him.
24
The Court was concerned with the government's use of suppression hearing
statements because it would result in a defendant perjuring himself in satisfy-
ing standing requirements while claiming in his defense lack of possession
or interest in the item seized.25 As a result, the Court created what is known
as automatic standing:26 "[t]he same element . . . which has caused a dilem-
ma, i.e., that possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any
necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched
or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is
challenged." 27
In 1968, with automatic standing still intact, the Supreme Court in Sim-
mons v. United States2 created a privilege for defendants accused of possessory
or non-possessory offenses by precluding the use of suppression hearing
testimony at trial. Simmons was a case involving armed robbery.2 9 A defen-
dant, Garrett, had testified in a suppression motion to having an interest in
certain property seized by law enforcement officials." Garrett's motion was
denied,3 ' and over objection by his attorney the suppression hearing testimony
was admitted at trial against him as evidence of guilt. 2
20. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
21. Id. at 259.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 261-62.
25. Id. at 262. While the Jones Court was concerned with the government having the ad-
vantage of a defendant's contradictory positions, the Court was also concerned with the govern-
ment having to take contradictory positions (trying to bar the suppression motion by showing
defendant's lack of interest in the property searched or seized, yet prosecuting for possession).
Id. at 263-64.
26. See generally sources cited supra note 16.
27. Jones, 362 U.S. at 263.
28. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
29. Id. at 379.
30. Id. at 381. The defendant had given suppression hearing testimony to exclude a suitcase
which contained incriminating contents. The testimony included a statement that the suitcase
was similar to one he owned and that he owned the clothing therein. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Garrett argued before the Supreme Court that "his constitutional rights
were violated when testimony given by him in support of his 'suppression'
motion was admitted against him at trial.' 3 3 The Court agreed. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, found that it was "intolerable that one constitu-
tional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. ' 34 As
a result, the Court held that "when a defendant testifies in support of a mofion
to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes
no objection." 3 5
In 1980, the Supreme Court dramatically changed the standing requirements
to assert a fourth amendment violation. In United States v. Salvucci,36 the
Court overruled the automatic standing rule of Jones, stating that the rule
"has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. ' 37 In Salvucci, the defendants were charged with unlawful
possession of stolen mail. 38 Defendants filed a motion to suppress a number
of stolen checks found during a search by law enforcement officials. The
district court granted the motion.39 Despite the government's appeal that the
defendants lacked standing, the First Circuit affirmed, ruling that automatic
standing obviated the need for them to "establish a legitimate and reasonable
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or property seized. 
4
0
The Supreme Court found, however, that the defendants had not satisfied
certain entry conditions in order to utilize the protections of the fourth amend-
ment. They were unable to "establish that they had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the areas ... where the goods were seized;"'" that is, the defen-
dants failed to show standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search.4 '
The defendant's fear, that prosecutors could use at trial for impeachment
purposes the suppression hearing testimony presented to establish standing4
3
(thus creating the "dilemma" identified in Jones), was not addressed by the
Court.4 4 Instead, the Court stated that "[tihe 'dilemma' identified in Jones
... was eliminated by our decision in Simmons v. United States .... Sim-
33. Id. at 382.
34. Id. at 394.
35. Id.
36. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
37. Id. at 95.
38. Id. at 85.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1097 (1979).
41. 448 U.S. 83, 95.
42. The Court viewed automatic standing as only providing a "windfall to defendant's whose
Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated." Id. at 95. There has been an ongoing
debate over whether the automatic standing rule should have been retained. See generally Slobogin,
Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules and Some Suggestions for
New Ones, 18 AM. Calm. L. REv. 387 (1981); Note, Criminal Law and Procedure-Search and
Seizure, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 504 (1981); Note, United States v. Salvucci: The Problematic'
Absence of Automatic Standing, 8 PEPPE.DiNE L. Rav. 1045 (1981).
43. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 93.
44. Id. at 93-94.
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mons ... extends protection against this risk of self-incrimination in all of
the cases covered by Jones . . . [and] grants a form of 'use immunity' to
those defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes." '
Salvucci's Signals on the Scope of the Simmons Protections
In its analysis as to why automatic standing was no longer needed, the
Salvucci Court recognized defendants' concern that using suppression hear-
ing testimony to impeach them at trial goes against the "dilemma" principle
of Jones."' Although the Court did not precisely address whether the use of
suppression hearing testimony for impeachment creates an unconstitutional
dilemma for a defendant, 7 the Salvucci opinion provides some signals as to
how the Court might decide this issue. The Court, citing three state court
decisions where suppression hearing testimony was held to be admissible to
impeach a defendant and one federal appeals case that discusses the impeach-
ment issue, 8 stated that "[t]his Court has not decided whether Simmons
45. Id. at 89-90.
46. Id. at 93.
47. Salvucci is the only Supreme Court case to date in which the Court has addressed (or
failed to address) a party's argument against the use of suppression hearing testimony for im-
peachment purposes. While Simmons and Jones concerned the use of suppression hearing testimony,
the defendants in both of these cases were trying to block the use of their hearing testimony
on the issue of guilt.
48. 448 U.S. 83, 93 n.8. The three state court cases cited in footnote 8 of the opinion were
Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 3d 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979); People v. Douglas, 66 Cal. App.
3d 998, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1977); and People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974).
The federal case cited was Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In Gray v. State, the court, in referring to the impeachment issue, decided in summary fashion
that "there is nothing in Simmons v. United States, that precludes the use of testimony at a
suppression hearing for such a purpose." 43 Md. App. 3d at 245. In People v. Douglas the
court stated that the Simmons Court "did not have before it . . . the more limited question
of whether such testimony might be admissible for the purpose of impeachment." 66 Cal. App.
3d at 1003, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The court held:
We concluded that defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing may be used
for impeachment purposes if he takes the stand at his trial and testifies in a manner
inconsistent with his pretrial testimony .... In the event that he chooses to testify
truthfully at trial, he runs no risk of being impeached.
Id. at 1006-07, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 363. In People v. Sturgis, the court also stated that Simmons
concerns only the use of suppression hearing testimony as evidence of guilt, and held that
"testimony of a defendant or documents voluntarily attested to by him in conjunction with his
motion to suppress evidence... may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant
choose to testify at trial." 58 I11. 2d at 216.
The opinion in Woody v. United States was written by then circuit Judge Burger. Burger com-
mented on what should be considered by a lower court, on remand, in deciding whether certain
statements made by a defendant prior to Miranda warnings were voluntary:
Allowing an accused to testify out of the jury's hearing at 9:30 a.m., for example,
does not give him a license for perjury at 11:00 a.m., when the jury is recalled.
* * * [I]f the appellant on remand testified that he indeed made incriminating
statements but that these utterances were coerced, he could surely be impeached
by his testimony in this case that he had made no such statements whatever ..
..Similarly if an accused testifies in a non-jury hearing to suppress evidence, his
testimony at that hearing may be used, at the very least, to irrpeach later contrary
statements.
379 F.2d at 131-32.
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precludes the use of a defendant's testimony.., at trial."' 49 The Salvucci Court
concluded by stating:
[W]hether "use immunity" extends only through the Government's case-
in-chief, or beyond that to the direct and cross-examination of a defen-
dant in the event he chooses to take the stand ... need not be and is
not resolved here, for it is an issue which more aptly relates to the proper
breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for retaining
automatic standing.' 0
The Salvucci Court's citations suggest that it would allow the use of sup-
pression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes." But if the Court tru-
ly believes the answer to the impeachment issue lies within the "breadth"
of Simmons, the Court may find a different result. The Simmons decision
is very different from the state and federal court cases cited in Salvucci.
The Simmons Court was concerned with protecting testimony given in sup-
port of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds. The
Court discussed the need of having an exclusionary rule but only limiting its
use to those individuals whose rights are violated." The Court also analyzed
at length the effect of Jones on standing.5 3 The Court viewed the defendant's
suppression testimony as "an integral part of his Fourth Amendment exclu-
sion claim . .. [but that the defendant] could give that testimony only by
assuming the risk that the testimony would later be admitted against him at
trial. '5 5 The Court considered "it intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.""
While the Simmons Court had no occasion to reach the issue of using sup-
pression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes, the Court did recognize
the hazards of testifying at a suppression hearing without testimonial protec-
tions, and the tension that it created between competing constitutional rights.
5 6
Also, at least according to Salvucci, Simmons is supposed to offer all of the
protections afforded by Jones.7 To assess the extent of the Simmons protec-
tions, therefore, it is important to determine what interests the Jones Court
was trying to protect.
49. 448 U.S. 83, 93-94. Following this quotation, in footnote 9 of the opinion, the Court
cited United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974). In Kahan, the defendant had testified at
arraignment that he was without funds and needed appointed counsel. It was later determined
that the defendant had access to funds. The Court, allowing the government to use defendant's
prior inconsistent statements regarding lack of funds in its case in chief, stated that "[tlhe pro-
tective shield of Simmons is not to be converted into a license for false representation ......
Id. at 243.
50. 448 U.S. 83, 94.
51. See supra notes 48-49.
52. 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968). For the facts of Simmons, see supra text accompanying notes
29-32.
53. Id. at 389-92.
54. Id. at 391.
55. Id. at 394 (see supra text accompanying note 35, for the specific language of the Simmons
rule).
56. Id. at 391-94.
57. 448 U.S. 83, 89. "The 'dilemma' identified in Jones ... was eliminated by our decision
in Simmons v. United States." See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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In creating the automatic standing rule, Jones was concerned with standing
requirements that force a defendant to testify to facts which, if made available
to the prosecution, could be sufficient to convict him.58 The Jones opinion
also reveals that the Court was concerned with the use of suppression hearing
testimony to test witness credibility. The Court discussed what effect pre-
automatic standing rules had on a defendant involved in a suppression hearing:
[The defendant is] faced, not only with the chance that the allegations
made on the motion to suppress may be used against him at trial, although
that they may is by no means an inevitable holding, but also with the
encouragement that he perjure himself if he seeks to establish "standing"
while maintaining a defense to the charge of possession."
This language is evidence that Jones was concerned with witness credibility
as it relates to a defendant asserting one position at the suppression hearing
and asserting another at trial. It is unclear whether witness credibility was
as important to the Jones Court as was preventing the use of suppression
hearing testimony on the issue of guilt. Because Jones was concerned with
a defendant trying to block use of hearing testimony as direct evidence of
guilt 60 (as was Simmons6'), it is difficult to say whether the Jones Court would
lend its words to a defendant before the Court only on the impeachment issue.
On its face, however, Jones seems to stand for two goals: not allowing
the use of suppression hearing testimony against the defendant at trial, and
keeping the defendant from perjuring himself by having to establish standing.62
If this is the proper analysis of the protections afforded by Jones, then Sim-
mons should also stand for these two goals, assuming the Salvucci Court was
correct when it decided that Simmons deals fully with the protections afford-
ed by Jones and automatic standing. 3 If Simmons does not concern itself
with the impeachment issue,"6 then the Salvucci Court incorrectly determined
the extent of the Simmons protections.65 In either case, the few signals pro-
vided by the Supreme Court on whether suppression hearing testimony can
be used for impeachment purposes are at best confusing, if not inconsistent.
As a result, it is little wonder that courts6 and commentators67 arrive at dif-
58. 362 U.S. 257, 261-62. See also supra note 25.
59. Id. at 262.
60. Id. at 259.
61. 390 U.S. 377, 381.
62. See supra text accompanying note 59.
63. 448 U.S. 83, 89-90.
64. See cases cited supra note 4.
65. Note, Defendants Charged with Crimes of Possession May Claim the Benefits of the
Exclusionary Rule Only if Their Fourth Amendment Rights Have Been Violated, 3 WHITHMR
L. REv. 257, 271 n.100 (1981) (if the Jones Court was trying to deal with impeachment as well
as self-incrimination, then Simmons solves only half of the problem).
66. See supra notes 4-6.
67. Compare Moore, supra note 12, at 304 n.6, with LAFAvE, supra note 11, at 14 (Supp.
1982). See also WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 754; Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and
Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. Cius. L. REv.
387, 398-99 n.118 (1981).
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ferent interpretations as to the scope of the Simmons protections. While the
Court is certainly not bound by the language in Salvucci that is relevant to
the impeachment issue, the Court should attempt to alleviate the present con-
fusion surrounding its signals.
"CHOOSING" BETWEEN CONSTiTUTIONAL RIGHTS
A Continuum of Constitutional Choices
Over the years, a continuum has developed that relates to the choices an
individual must sometimes make between the exercise of one of two constitu-
tional rights. Along this continuum are cases in which the Supreme Court
has found the imposition of such a choice to be unreasonable; in other cases
the choice has been justified. What becomes apparent in an analysis of cases
requiring an election between constitutional rights is that the critical compo-
nent is the nature of the choice a defendant must make; that is, whether the
choice is truly voluntary or forced.
In our judicial system there are situations in which a defendant can exer-
cise a right without waiving some other constitutional right (e.g., a decision
not to testify at trial), and therefore not be required to choose between rights.
At the other extreme our system allows for situations in which a defendant
can do nothing yet waive a constitutional right (e.g., a decision not to contest
the legality of a search and seizure waives a claim of a fourth amendment
violation), and in this sense requires that a defendant choose between exercis-
ing that right and waiving it. Our judicial system also allows for situations
between these extremes in which a defendant can exercise a right, yet at the
same time waive a different constitutional right (e.g., a decision to testify
at trial requires a waiver of a right to remain silent when cross-examined),
thereby forcing a defendant to choose between the benefit of exercising one
right and preventing the loss of another.
While the existence of a choice between constitutional rights does not in
itself create a constitutional issue, what is at issue is whether this election
of one of these rights over the other "violates the constitutional 'policies'
underlying one or more of the two rights," '68 and therefore is not constitu-
tionally permissible. To determine whether an election is constitutionally per-
missible, at least when the Constitution is silent as to how tensions between
constitutional choices are to be resolved, 69 the question becomes whether, on
balance, the conditioning of a constitutional right can be justified by a signifi-
cant state interest. This balancing is a process of analysis 70 to determine the
68. See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture
of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 758 (1981).
69. Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1022, 1029,
1046 (1978).
70. Id. at 1048-49. See generally Westen, A way From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture
of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
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competing defendant and state interests, the relative weights that should be
assigned to each interest, and the events which occur that affect this balancing.
These various situations involving the choosing of rights become important
when it is realized that the courts are applying different levels of scrutiny
depending on which situation a defendant encounters. By analyzing cases within
these situations which form the continuum that relates to the choices a defen-
dant must sometimes make between constitutional rights, insight can be gained
into what is considered a reasonable or unreasonable choice. While labels such
as "reasonable" and "unreasonable" have no predictive value in themselves,
the process of determining the inherent policies and factors which make
reasonable cases on the continuum similar to and distinguishable from
unreasonable cases, helps resolve whether or not the use of suppression hear-
ing testimony requires that a defendant make a constitutionally permissible
choice between rights.
The Foundation Cases
It is easiest to begin the analysis with cases that seem to fall more at the
extremes of the continuum. In Corbitt v. New Jersey,'7 for example, a defen-
dant was faced with a choice between taking his murder prosecution to the
jury, thereby risking a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment, and enter-
ing a plea of non vult to a judge with the possibility of receiving less than
a life sentence." In essence, the defendant had to choose between exercising
his right to a jury trial with the hope of getting a sympathetic jury (but getting
a life sentence if he lost his case), and not exercising his right to a jury trial
but receiving a benefit in the way of a shorter sentence if he lost his case.
The state encouraged the defendant not to exercise this right. The choice for
the defendant was a voluntary one. The result of the choice would effect no
other constitutional rights (there is no right to a lesser sentence).
The defendant argued that this choice violated of his fifth, sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights. 73 The Supreme Court did not agree: "not every
burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid." 7 ' The Court agreed with
the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that there was a substantial state
interest in requiring that the defendant make such a choice, and that it was
71. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
72. Id. at 215.
73. Id. at 216.
74. Id. at 218. In footnote 8 of the Corbitt opinion the Court quoted from language contained
in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971):
The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations
requiring "the making of difficult judgments" as to which course to follow. Although
a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever
course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring
him to choose.
Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
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not a "needless or arbitrary burden on the defendant's constitutional rights
. . . .,7 The test related to constitutional choices that derives from Corbitt,
then, asks whether the state's action is an unnecessary burden on the defen-
dant's rights and whether this imposition serves a substantial state interest.
In Stein v. New York, 7 the Supreme Court confronted a situation in which
the defendant was required to make a different choice. The defendant wanted
to testify at trial that certain admissions at a preliminary hearing were coerced,
but did not want to be cross-examined out of fear of incrimination." In this
situation if the defendant testified, he was benefited by the introduction of
favorable evidence; but if he did not testify, he was benefited by the protec-
tion against self-incrimination. The defendant had to waive the right to testify
at trial78 at the exercise of another; the waiver, however, took place only after
first obtaining a benefit from the exercise of a right. The choice was also
a voluntary one as nothing would happen (the waiver of some other constitu-
tional right) if the defendant chose not to testify.
The Supreme Court held that "[in a trial of a coercion issue... an accused
must choose between the disadvantage from silence and that from testifying." 79
The Court made it clear that the Constitution does not protect the right to
remain silent when a defendant begins to reap the benefits that come with
the right to testify.' 0 Once a defendant testifies at trial, the policy reasons
for protecting the defendant from self-incrimination shift in favor of the state's
interest in testing the credibility of witnesses. When the defendant testifies
at trial, the state is placed in a worse position. To regain the proper balance
between the state's interests and defendant's interests, the Court allows the
defendant to be cross-examined.
At the other end of the constitutional continuum, in contrast to Stein and
Corbitt, are cases such as Garrity v. New Jersey" and Spevack v. Klein. 2
In Garrity, the defendant was confronted by the choice between exercising
the right to remain silent with the possibility of job forfeiture, and testifying
thus risking self-incrimination in later criminal proceedings. 3 Either choice
75. 439 U.S. 212, 223. See also Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (a state statute allow-
ing a jury to determine both guilt and punishment in a single verdict, did not unconditionally
force a defendant to choose between the right to remain silent at trial and the right to plead
on the issue of punishment); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (not all guilty pleas
encouraged out of fear of possible death are involuntary); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 795 (1969) ("an otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by a defendant's
desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial").
76. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
77. Id. at 159-60.
78. While there is no express right in the Constitution or Bill of Rights to testify at trial,
the Supreme Court "has recently assumed the existence of a right to testify." Bradley, Havens,
Jenkins, and Salvucci and the Defendant's "'Right" to Testify, 18 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 422
(1981). See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S 222, 225 (1971).
79. 346 U.S. at 177.
80. Id.
81. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
82. 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (5-4 decision).
83. 385 U.S. at 496.
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would damage the defendant in some way. Any benefit from testifying would
be washed out by self-incrimination, and any benefit from remining silent
would be negated by the threat of job loss. The choice was, therefore, not
a voluntary one. The Supreme Court stated that in this situation, "[tihe option
to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination
is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent." 84
In Spevack, the Court dealt with a member of the New York Bar Associa-
tion who was confronted with a choice between producing certain records
and foregoing a right to remain silent (thereby incriminating himself), and
remaining silent but facing possible disbarment. 8" As in Garrity, the defen-
dant had a choice between two options-either of which would have harmed
him. If the defendant chose not to testify, he could have been disbarred;
however, if he chose to testify, he could have subjected himself to self-
incrimination at a later trial. The defendant was forced to decide which option
would be less damaging to him; there was no alternative route which would
produce a favorable result.
The Supreme Court disapproved of the choice the defendant in Spevack
had to make. "[T]he Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
• . . extends its protection to lawyers . . . and . . . should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a
livelihood as a price for asserting it."' 8" In Garrity and Spevack, the Court
balanced the defendant's interests in not being compelled to testify against
the state's interest in obtaining information. Several considerations factored
into the balance which favored the defendant: whether the same information
could have been obtained by other means, the need for the penalty (loss of
job or disbarment), and the possibility of self-incrimination.
Situations Analogous to a Suppression Hearing
Corbitt, Stein, Garrity, and Spevack are several cases87 that form the two
poles of the continuum of reasonable and unreasonable choices a defendant
must sometimes make. Other cases which fall more towards the center of the
continuum, however, are more analogous to the suppression hearing/impeach-
ment issue. Cases dealing with parole revocation proceedings, for example,
are in many ways similar to a suppression hearing. In these cases, a defen-
dant is sometimes faced with a choice between constitutional rights because
of the threat of impeachment.
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Alaska decided McCracken v. Corey." A
84. Id. at 497.
85. 385 U.S. at 512-13.
86. Id. at 514.
87. It is not within the scope of this Note to attempt to review all of the state and federal
cases that have dealt with the making of constitutional choices. Rather, a few cases were offered
as examples of the make-up of the continuum which has developed over the years.
88. 612 P.2d 990 (Ala. 1980).
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felon had been charged with possession of a firearm, a violation of the terms
of the felon's parole.8 9 As the parole revocation proceeding was held prior
to his hearing on criminal charges, the defendant did not testify at the revoca-
tion proceedings to preserve his defenses. Because of his silence, the revoca-
tion board found the defendant in violation of his parole. 90 In this situation
the defendant had to choose between testifying at his parole hearing for the
benefit of his immediate case but incriminating himself at a later trial, and
not testifying and protecting against self-incrimination but damaging his parole
violation case (thereby possibly losing his freedom). Because he had to choose
one route (testifying or remaining silent) which triggered some harm to him,
the defendant's choice was less than voluntar;,.
The defendant in McCracken claimed that the scheduling of the revocation
proceeding prior to trial "forced him to make an unconstitutional election
between his due process right to present a defense at the hearing and his right
against compulsory self-incrimination." 9 ' The Supreme Court of Alaska
agreed, stating that "[in the interests of fairness, a parolee should not be
forced to choose between remaining mute at a revocation proceeding, thereby
surrendering his right to present a defense, or testifying at the revocation hear-
ing and incurring the possibility of incriminating himself." 92 While the court
in McCracken held that the testimony presented at the revocation hearing
was inadmissible in later criminal proceedings, 93 the court did not state whether
such hearing testimony could be used for impeachment purposes. The court
did, however, rely heavily on the California decision of People v. Coleman;94
Coleman discusses the impeachment issue in the context of the parole revoca-
tion proceeding. 9
In Coleman, the parolee was faced with the same predicament. 96 The
Supreme Court of California also characterized this situation as a self-
incrimination problem. 97 The Coleman court, however, was more explicit in
describing the extent of protection afforded the defendant from the use of
the revocation hearing testimony against him at trial. The court stated that
testimony given during a probation revocation hearing was inadmissible against
the defendant at later proceedings on criminal charges. 9 Probation hearing
testimony was admissible, however, for impeachment or rebuttal purposes if
the defendant presented testimony at trial that was clearly inconsistent with
89. Id. at 991.
90. Id. The defendant was later acquitted of the criminal charges. Id. at 992.
91. Id. at 993.
92. Id. at 997-98. The court also made an analogy to the job forfeiture cases, discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 81-86. 612 P.2d at 994 & n.10.
93. Id. at 998.
94. Id. at 995-98.
95. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
96. Id. at 888-89, 533 P.2d at 1041, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 889, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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his probation revocation hearing testimony.99 The court reasoned that Califor-
nia's exclusionary rule already protected against the use of a probationer's
testimony (at least as far as direct use). Consequently, it denied the defen-
dant's claim that he was forced to forego his fifth amendment right to remain
silent.'°
In the probation revocation setting, then, there exists the potential for pro-
bation revocation testimony being used to impeach a defendant who later
testifies at his trial.' In this situation the defendant must choose between
exercising a right to testify and protecting himself from incrimination at later
proceedings. In McCracken and Coleman, the imposition on the defendant's
rights by using hearing testimony as direct evidence was too great compared
to the state's interest. The state has little or no interest in scheduling parole
revocation proceedings before a trial."0 2 But when a defendant's testimony
is "clearly inconsistent," the policy interests in protecting the defendant from
self-incrimination become subservient to a greater state interest in showing
that he may have lied at either the parole revocation proceeding or at trial.
Under Coleman, this state interest supercedes the interest in protecting against
the chance that a defendant will refrain from testifying at his parole revoca-
tion hearing out of fear that it could, to some degree, require him to forego
his fifth amendment rights."0 3
Although courts allow the use of parole revocation hearing testimony for
impeachment purposes at trial and do not see this as requiring a defendant
to make an unreasonable choice between constitutional rights, this is not the
case with the use of grand jury testimony. In 1979, the Supreme Court decided
in New Jersey v. Portash'°" that "testimony before a grand jury under a grant
99. Id. The inconsistency must be "so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's ad-
mission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact
the probability that the probationer has committed perjury at either the trial or the revocation
hearing." Id.
100. Id. at 892, 533 P.2d at 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
101. The Coleman court discussed at length the use of the hearing testimony for impeachment
purposes. Id. One can compare this use of testimony for impeachment purposes to situations
such as habitual criminal proceedings in which the use of this type of hearing testimony for
impeachment has also been allowed. See People v. Chavez, __ Colo. -, 621 P.2d 1362
(1981). In Chavez, the defendant made a motion to exclude from the habitual proceeding any
testimony that he might give at trial. __ Colo. at -, 621 P.2d at 1364. The constitutional
choices exercised by the defendant were the right to testify in one's defense, and the right to
have the state prove the elements of his habitual criminality. The court held that substantive
use of the defendant's trial testimony in this manner burdens the defendant's right to testify.
The court also held, however, that the "impeachment use of an admission of prior convictions
elicited from a defendant who chooses to testify is permissible." - Colo. at - , 621 P.2d
at 1366. See also United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979) (statements made at
a pretrial hearing while exercising an eighth amendment right are admissible at trial on question
of guilt as well as for impeachment).
102. The California Supreme Court saw the solution to this problem as only requiring that
the parole revocation proceeding be scheduled after the criminal trial. 13 Cal. 3d at 889, 533
P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
103. Id. at 892, 533 P.2d at 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
104. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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of immunity cannot constitutionally be used to impeach.., a defendant in
a later criminal trial.' 0 5 The Court considered such grand jury testimony,
where the defendant was required to testify or be held for contempt, to be
the "essence of coerced testimony."' 0 6
In the grand jury situation the Supreme Court would not force the defen-
dant to choose between his right to testify at trial and his right not to in-
criminate himself. The defendant's choice in Portash was clearly involuntary,
and can be placed on the continuum with the situations addressed in Garrity
and Spevack. If the defendant did not testify he could be held in contempt.
If he did testify, however, he risked self-incrimination at a later trial. He was
forced to make a choice between two situations-either of which harmed him.
Some commentators argue that the situation the defendant faced in Por-
tash closely resembles the situation a defendant faces at a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence. Professor LaFave'07 believes the degree of coercion pre-
sent in the Portash grand jury situation is similar to the degree of coercion
in making a motion to suppress evidence in a suppression hearing (as the sup-
pression hearing is the only way to suppress evidence). 10 LaFave maintains
that the defendant in a motion to suppress evidence situation is compelled
to give testimony just as was the defendant in Portash, because the "defen-
dant is confronted with the choice of 'either to give up what he believed,
with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal
effect, to waive his Fifth AmenL nent privilege against self-incrimination.' "109
LaFave argues that "[t]his being so, it is certainly not fanciful to suggest that
defendant's testimony at a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing likewise
cannot later be used for impeachment purposes. '""'
Jones and Simmons
The constitutional posture of a grand jury or parole revocation proceeding
case is analogous to the posture of a case involving the use of suppression
hearing testimony to impeach. Two other important cases concerning con-
105. Id. at 459-60. In Portash, the defendant agreed to testify before a grand jury after being
granted immunity. After testifying, the state decided to bring charges against the defendant and
wanted to use the grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes. Id. at 451-52. The trial jtidge
ruled that the grand jury testimony could be used at his criminal trial to impeach him if he
testified. As a result, the defendant chose not to testify at his criminal trial and was later found
guilty. Id. at 452.
106. Id. at 459. Compare United States v. Guglielmini, 425 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1970) (grand
jury testimony can be used to impeach when the witness later testifies at trial, but is no longer
a defendant in the case).
107. See LAFAvE, supra note 11.
108. Id. at 196 (Supp. 1984).
109. Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States).
110. Id. Other commentators recognize the similarity between the choices a defendant must
make when testifying at a suppression hearing or before a grand jury. See Slobogin, supra note
42; Comment, Standing Up for Fourth Amendment Rights: Salvucci, Rawlings, and the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, 31 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 651, 681 (1981).
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stitutional choices in the context of suppression hearings are Jones v. United
States and Simmons v. United States.'" In Jones and Simmons, the defen-
dants could have testified at a suppression hearing in order to exercise a fourth
amendment right, thereby making that testimony available to the prosecution
for direct evidence of guilt, or could have remained silent at the suppression
hearing (and risk the possibility of the Court finding the defendants lacked
standing), losing a fourth amendment claim, but protecting against
self-incrimination." 1 2
This choice is as involuntary as the Portash situation in which the defen-
dant could have been held in contempt,' '3 and may be as involuntary as the
Spevack or Garrity situations in which there existed possible harm of job
forfeiture and self-incrimination." In Jones and Simmons, silence at the sup-
pression hearing was harmful because a fourth amendment claim was waived.
Non-silence was harmful, however, because the hearing testimony could be
used against the defendants at trial on the issue of guilt. Therefore, as in
Spevack, Garrity and Portash, the defendants in Jones and Simmons had a
choice between two options-either of which was harmful.
The degree of involuntariness the defendants faced in Jones and Simmons
was also greater than that of the defendants in McCracken and Coleman:"5
in Jones and Simmons, the involuntariness was in the form of waiving a fourth
amendment claim or facing self-incrimination; in McCracken and Coleman
the involuntariness was in the form of choosing between damaging their case
against parole revocation (not a constitutional right) and subjecting themselves
to self-incrimination at a later trial." 6 In Jones and Simmons, therefore, the
Supreme Court decided that the choices made by defendants were more akin
to the unconstitutional choices made in Stein and Corbitt (one end of the
constitutional continuum), than the constitutional choices made in Spevack
and Garrity (the other end of the constitutional continuum), and involve choices
more like those present in Portash, than in McCracken and Coleman."7
THE USE OF SUPPRESSION HEARING TESTIMONY TO IMPEACH
The various cases discussed above" have developed the foundation for the
continuum on which a future case concerning the suppression hearing testimony
impeachment issue, exposed in United States v. Salvucci,' 9 can be placed.' 20
I 11. For a discussion of the facts of Jones and Simmons, see supra notes 20-45 and accom-
panying text.
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 88-103.
116. Id.
117. Compare supra text accompanying notes 104-10, with supra text accompanying notes 88-103.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 71-117.
119. 448 U.S. 83, 94 (1980).
120. While this continuum allows for insight into what courts consider to be a constitutionally
permissible choice between rights, part of the answer will also be based on how this form of
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suppression hearing testimony (voluntary or involuntary) meshes with our judicial system's goal
of utilizing only legally obtained evidence. As the suppression hearing testimony/impeachment
issue is triggered only because of an alleged violation of search and seizure laws, it is also impor-
tant to analyze how the Supreme Court views the importance of being able to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, and analyze the choices a defendant must make if he knows illegally seized
evidence may be used against him at trial.
In certain situations the government can use illegally secured evidence to impeach a defendant
at trial, forcing the defendant to choose between his right to testify and his right to protect
against self-incrimination. This is analogous to the suppression hearing testimony/impeachment
situation, as the damaging evidence can be used to tarnish the defendant's credibility if he chooses
to testify; but if he remains silent to protect against the use of damaging impeachment evidence,
he foregoes his right to testify. The appropriate analysis here determines why a court will allow
the use of illegally secured evidence to impeach a witness, and then applies this reasoning to
the use of suppression hearing testimony.
Until recently, commentators, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Obser-
vations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1208,
have consistently read Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to prohibit the use of statements
in violation of its rules for any purpose. The language in Miranda that is important to the im-
peachment issue, however, is ambiguous:
When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. . . . [U]nless and until such [Miranda]
warnings and a waiver are demonstrated by the prosecutor at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added). The circuit courts are split over whether this language applies
to impeachment. See United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1968) (Miranda prohibits
the use of statements obtained in violation of its rules, "whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
whether bearing directly on guilt or on collateral matters only, and whether used on direct
examination or for impeachment"). See also Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (not allowing use for impeachment purposes); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998
(10th Cir. 1967) (not allowing use for impeachment purposes). But see United States v. Miller,
676 F.2d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1982) ("statements suppressed because of a Miranda violation
may be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf"); Woody
v. United States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (see supra note 48). A number of Supreme
Court cases can be examined, however, to interpret the extent of the Miranda protections against
the use of illegally obtained statements. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), has probably
had the greatest impact as to how Miranda should be interpreted. In Harris, the defendant made
statements in violation of Miranda, but did not claim the statements were coerced or involun-
tary. Id. at 224. The statements were admitted into evidence but were restricted to the question
of witness credibility. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, concluded that the lower
court made a proper ruling on the admissibility of this evidence for impeachment purposes. Id.
at 226. The Harris Court stated that "[ilt does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissi-
ble against an accused in the prosecutor's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided that
the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards." Id. at 224. The Court concluded
that while everyone has a right to testify, no one has a right to commit perjury; "[t]he shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 225-26.
Harris has been criticized by both commentators, see Dershowitz & Ely, supra, and courts.
A number of state courts disagree with Harris, and refuse to follow the decision or recognize
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Miranda. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545
P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (the California Constitution prohibits any use whatsoever
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda); Commonwealth v. T~iplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341
A.2d 62 (1975) (any statement by a defendant declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppres-
sion court cannot be used for impeachment purposes). Some find solace by interpreting Harris
to mean that statements that do not meet "legal standards" of "trustworthiness" may not be
used for impeachment. See State v. Denny, 27 Ariz. App. 354, 555 P.2d 111 (1976) (using Harris'
"trustworthiness" test to find statements made by a defendant to be inadmissible for impeach-
ment purposes).
Despite the criticisms, the Supreme Court continues to follow Harris in fifth amendment im-
peachment cases. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), for example, the Court reiterated
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that evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is not barred for all purposes. The Court found
that the statements made by this appellant met the trustworthiness standard of Harris as they
were not coerced or involuntary: "[T]he pressure on him was no greater than that of any person
in like custody or under inquiry by any investigating officer.. . . . [I]nadmissibility would pervert
the constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of impeachment evidence
from the defendant's own mouth." Id. at 723.
Given cases like Harris and Hass, it is evident that Miranda is no longer a blanket protection
against the use of illegally obtained statements. The Court has, to a certain extent, shifted the
relative weight of certain interests in its constitutional analysis. The Court now balances the
interests of determining witness credibility against the interests in barring illegally obtained evidence
that meets the Harris standard of trustworthiness. Once trustworthiness is established, the defen-
dant's interest in suppressing the statement becomes less than the state's interest in clarifying
witness credibility and in barring immunity. Since Miranda protections are restricted by the Supreme
Court, the question then becomes whether it will do the same to the Simmons protections. Because
many of the constitutional interests and policy justifications under Miranda fall under Simmons,
the Harris perspective will influence the Court's analysis of whether Simmons protects against
impeachment use of suppression hearing testimony.
While Miranda, Harris, and Hass are all fifth amendment cases that concern the use of illegally
obtained statements for impeachment purposes, the Court has also considered the impeachment
issue in the context of fourth amendment violations. In 1954, the Court decided in Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), that evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure
could be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes. Id. at 63-64. In Walder the Supreme
Court recognized the basic premise of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that the
government cannot violate the fourth amendment and use the fruits of the illegal conduct to
secure a conviction. 347 U.S. at 64-65. The Court, however, then made the distinction between
a government not being able to use such evidence affirmatively, and a defendant trying to use
the non-admissibility as "a shield against contradiction of his untruth. . . . [There is hardly
justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on
the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." Id. at 65.
The Walder Court also was quick to point out that the defendant "went beyond mere denial
of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he had
never dealt in or possessed any narcotics." Id. In doing so, the Court attempted to distinguish
Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), where the Court held that the use of illegally
seized evidence to rebut a witness was not allowed where the defendant was not asked on direct
examination anything pertaining to the illegally seized evidence. The Walder Court implied that
Angello was limited to those defendants who "did nothing to waive his constitutional protection
or to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the
search." 347 U.S. at 66. Presumably, the Walder Court believed that the defendant at bar failed
to meet that condition.
The basic principles that underly Walder have been affirmed recently by United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court in Havens stated that "arriving at truth is a fundamental goal
of our legal system." Id. at 626. The Court made it clear that defendants who choose to testify
as well as those who-are compelled to testify, must do so truthfully or suffer the consequences.
Id. The Court considered the use of illegally seized evidence as a proper and effective way of
cross-examination to elicit the truth: "[H]is privilege against self-incrimination does not shield
him from proper questioning." Id. at 626-27.
Also interesting about Havens as a fourth amendment/impeachment case is the Court's reliance
on Harris and Hass as the controlling policy. Id. This suggests that the Court believes that the
language in fourth and fifth amendment cases can be readily meshed to support either type of
case. The Supreme Court in Harris (fifth amendment case) relied heavily on Walder (fourth
amendment case). 401 U.S. 222, 224-25. The Court in Havens (fourth amendment case) relied
heavily on Harris and Hass (fifth amendment cases) 446 U.S. 620, 626-27. While the Supreme
Court may not view these differences in cases as important in answering questions regarding
the use of illegally secured evidence for impeachment purposes, the distinctions do become im-
portant when confronted with such a situation as related to the use of suppression hearing testimony
for impeachment purposes. As both fifth and fourth amendment rights are triggered (a right
to protect against self-incrimination and the right to protect against an illegal search and seizure),
the constitutional analysis the Court will perform should differ considerably from an analysis
of a case concerning a single constitutional right. See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Condition-
ing One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 757-60 (1981).
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These analogous cases have been examined to determine how they can gauge
the strength and validity of the various competing interests involved in using
suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes. Where the defen-
dant's "choice" between exercising a fourth amendment claim and preven-
ting self-incrimination if the state can use suppression hearing testimony to
impeach will be placed on the continuum of reasonable and unreasonable
choices, depends upon the result of a constitutional analysis not yet performed
by the Supreme Court.
The Failings of the Burger Court
In United States v. Salvucci,'2 ' the Burger Court erred when it failed to
take heed of the defendant's fear that testimony given by him in a suppres-
sion hearing to establish standing could be used against him for impeachment
purposes.' 22 Had the Court's majority performed a thorough analysis of the
defendant's arguments in Salvucci, it would have realized that such fears were
justified as the defendant may have been forced to make an impermissible
choice between constitutional rights. A thorough analysis of the dilemma faced
by the defendant in Salvucci reveals that the Burger Court made certain
erroneous assumptions, and failed to address properly the constitutionality
of forcing a defendant either to assert a fourth amendment right by testifying
at a suppression hearing or to protect against self-incrimination at trial.
It has been said that each time "the exclusionary rule is applied there is
a social cost directly proportional to the relevance of the excluded evidence.' 23
Clearly, the Court in Salvucci was concerned with the needs of the govern-
ment in being able to utilize suppression hearing testimony for impeachment
purposes. 124 Despite this concern, however, the Court still should have weighed
the disadvantage of deterring a defendant from testifying at a motion to sup-
press out of fear of being impeached at trial, or deterring a defendant from
testifying at trial if he has already testified at a suppression hearing, against
the advantages flowing to the government in being permitted to use suppres-
sion hearing testimony for impeachment purposes. Viewed in a different way,
the Court should have balanced the defendant's (or society's) interest in ex-
cluding illegally secured evidence with the state's interest in having evidence
pertaining to the defendant's credibility.
Thus, the real issue confronting the defendant in Salvucci was "whether
the disadvantages associated with deterring a defendant from testifying on
a motion to suppress are significant enough to offset the advantages of per-
mitting the Government to use such testimony .... ,,125 It is evident that
121. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
122. Id. at 93.
123. White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333,
334 (1970).
124. 448 U.S. at 93.
125. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
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"arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system," '26 and that
the Court has "repeatedly insisted that when defendants testify, they must
testify truthfully or suffer the consequences." ' 27 Obviously, part of the
theoretical basis for allowing impeachment is to check the credibility of
witnesses and to foster truthtelling.' 2' Therefore, from a policy standpoint,
the state is in a worse position when a defendant testifies at trial, than it
was before the defendant took the stand.'29 The "state must show [,however,]
that the prejudice it suffers from the change of position is constitutionally
significant;"I 3' that is, the defendant's interest in exercising his right to testify
is outweighed by the state's interest in attacking the false or damaging
evidence. ' 3'
United States v. Simmons132 was designed, in part, to respond to state in-
terests by recognizing that a defendant might have to testify at a suppression
hearing to establish standing to assert a fourth amendment claim.' 33 By
eliminating automatic standing,' 34 the Burger Court in Salvucci wanted to pro-
tect further the state's interest in preventing what it perceived to be false
representations of fourth amendment claims ' 3 and a "windfall to defendants
whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated."' 36 The defendant
in Simmons was also protected, however, because the state could not use the
suppression hearing testimony on the issue of guilt. '
What the Burger Court failed to recognize in its treatment of Salvucci,
however, is that Jones v. United States 31 (by providing automatic standing)
and Simmons (by preventing the use of suppression hearing testimony as
evidence of guilt) arguably were also designed to serve the defendant in other
ways not addressed in Salvucci. Both cases appear to grant a form of
126. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. -620, 626 (1980). See also supra note 120.
127. Id.
128. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 34, at 68 (2d ed. & Supp. 1978).
129. Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture
of Another, 66 IOWA L. REy. 741, 750 (1981).
130. Id. at 751 n.33 (emphasis in original).
131. Id. What is also evident from cases such as United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626
(1980), and United States v. Harris, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971), is that little defendant (or public)
interest is served by excluding evidence for impeachment purposes because it might have a deter-
rent effect on police misconduct. The Supreme Court believes the same amount of deterrent
effect on police misconduct can be achieved if the evidence is excluded only from the prosecutor's
case in chief. 446 U.S. at 626. The Court sees it as only a "speculative possibility," 401 U.S.
at 225, that making illegally seized evidence unavailable for impeachment "would contribute
substantially" to deter unlawful searches and seizures. 446 U.S. at 626.
132. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See also supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 390-91.
134. 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980).
135. See id. at 94 n.8, 95.
136. Id. at 95 (emphasis in original).
137. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
138. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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immunity'39 to foster uninhibited testimony at the suppression hearing,'4 ° but
in doing so require that such testimony be excluded from trial for two reasons.
First, the assertions at a suppression hearing are of a nature sufficient to con-
vict him if brought out at trial.' 4' Also, the state should be prevented from
using suppression hearing testimony to impeach a defendant at trial which
could result in a defendant being wrongfully convicted of a crime he did not
commit.
In creating this immunity from the potentially harmful use of testimony
given at a suppression hearing, Jones and Simmons rely upon the correct
assumption that a defendant is more likely to commit perjury (possibly coached
by his attorney without any apparent consequences) at a suppression hearing
to establish standing in order to suppress certain evidence. What follows from
this assumption is that if the defendant fails to establish standing at the sup-
pression hearing, the defendant will truthfully disclose at trial that the illegally
seized evidence is not his. Lying by the defendant will occur most often when
his interests for doing so are great and the repercussions are worth the risk. I2
When automatic standing was still intact, the defendant's interests in produc-
ing certain testimony at the suppression hearing to ensure standing to assert
a fourth amendment violation were minimal. Without automatic standing,
however, the defendant's interests clearly require him to produce testimony,
possibly perjurious, which will allow a court to find that the defendant has
standing to assert a fourth amendment violation. Thus, while the Salvucci
Court's rationale was to prevent false assertions of a fourth amendment
claim, 43 the Court failed to recognize certain repercussions fostered by
automatic standing.
The Burger Court's rationale behind Salvucci seems sound; but this rationale
works only if it is assumed that the defendant is telling the truth at the sup-
pression hearing and is lying at trial. The rationale in Salvucci for eliminating
automatic standing is unsound if lying takes place at the suppression hearing.
With automatic standing, the Salvucci Court feared fraudulent fourth amend-
ment claims." But with the removal of automatic standing, the Court now
139. In the context of Jones, immunity was in the form of granting automatic standing. See
supra text accompanying note 27. In Simmons, the immunity was a 'use immunity' to those
defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes" and a "protection against [the] risk of self-
incrimination in all of the cases covered by Jones [possessory offenses]." 448 U.S. 83, 90 (Salvucci
Court interpreting Simmons).
140. 390 U.S. 377, 392-93.
141. 362 U.S. at 261-62.
142. "The principle is founded on a knowledge of human nature. Self-interest induces men
to be cautious in saying anything against themselves, but free to speak in their own favor. We
can safely trust a man when he speaks against his own interest." 5 J. WIGmoRE ON EVIDENcE
§ 1457 (1974) (quoting Gibblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle 437, 438 (Pa. 1832)).
143. See 448 U.S. 83, 94 n.9, 95.
144. Id.
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requires that defendants testify at the suppression hearing in order to obtain
standing to assert a fourth amendment claim. 145 The defendant will be pro-
ducing testimony concerning essential elements of his case,'" for his own
interests. Consequently, the defendant will be more likely to perjure himself.'4 7
Because of the Burger Court's incorrect assumption that lying takes place
at trial, and its failure to recognize that lying by the innocent defendant '"
is more likely to take place at the suppression hearing, the innocent defen-
dant who makes a small mistake (perjury) at the suppression hearing to satisfy
standing requirements pays too high a price for wrongly being found guilty
at trial for a crime he did not commit. In this situation, it is true that the
defendant lies one of two times in giving testimony under oath. The problem
is that a jury will misuse the small lie at the suppression hearing'" (e.g., assert-
ing possession of contraband to establish an interest in items illegally seized)
to convict the defendant of a major crime he did not commit when his truthful
trial testimony is impeached by the" earlier inconsistent statement from the
suppression hearing.' 0 Being found guilty of a major crime the defendant
did not commit is disproportionate to the extent of harm the state suffers
as a result of perjurious suppression hearing testimony.",
145. Id. at 95 (automatic standing has outlived its usefulness). See also supra notes 9-19 and
accompanying text.
146. See 390 U.S. 377, 391.
147. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
148. Obviously this analysis does not take into account those defendants that do not have
to testify at the suppression hearing to establish standing, see infra notes 166-67 and accompany-
ing text, and those defendants that are telling the truth at a suppression hearing (that they did
have an interest in the items seized) and are lying at trial that they did not commit the crime.
149. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EvmENc § 39, at 77 (1954);
Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MIcH.
L. REv. 1320, 1379 (1977) (judge's instructions to a jury regarding limited use of evidence do
not fully protect defendant from damage when such evidence is admitted). See, e.g., Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
150. This reasoning is applicable to other situations. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and other cases involving the use of illegally obtained confessions, trial testimony is prob-
ably perjurious. Common sense dictates that pre-trial confessions or statements admitting guilt
are more likely truthful because admitting guilt goes against a defendant's self-interest. Miranda
rules were established to prevent only the use of involuntarily obtained confessions as evidence
of guilt because their truthfulness is suspect. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Allowing the use of illegal but voluntarily obtained confessions to impeach, however, is the cor-
rect approach. The result is conviction of guilty parties since the defendant is probably testifying
falsely at trial that he did not take part in a crime he did indeed commit. In the Salvucci situa-
tion, however, lying more likely takes place at the suppression hearing in order to establish stand-
ing to assert a fourth amendment claim. The result here is that a lie at the suppression hearing
will be used as impeachment evidence to discredit the defendant's truthful statement at trial that
he did not commit the crime.
See also Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify, 18
AM. Cans. L. REv. 419 (1981). Bradley states that "[w]hen the ostensible search for truth becomes
merely a vehicle for circumventing the proper functioning of the exclusionary rule-that is, when
the primary impact of impeachment is to inculpate the defendant-then it is an exaltation of
form over substance to allow that 'impeachment' to proceed." Id. at 433.
151. For example in Indiana, perjury is a class D felony. IND. CODa § 35-44-2-1 (1982), and
punishable by a fixed term of two years, id. § 35-50-2-7, with up to two more years for aggravating
circumstances, id. § 35-4.1-4-7 and a $10,000 fine. While possession of most controlled substances
is also a class D felony in Indiana, id. § 35-48-4-6, dealing in narcotics (e.g. cocaine) (which
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Because the Salvucci Court failed to recognize the problems associated with
eliminating automatic standing, and because of its erroneous assumptions
regarding when a defendant is likely to commit perjury, the Court did not
realize that the prejudicial effect in allowing suppression hearing testimony
to impeach a defendant at trial is tremendous-a wrongful finding of guilt
for a crime the defendant did not commit. Had the Court performed a more
sound analysis, it would have recognized this prejudicial effect and weighed
it against the probative value of using suppression hearing testimony for im-
peachment purposes.' 2 Clearly, the "probative value [in using suppression
hearing testimony to impeach] is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."' 53 While
a judge may instruct a jury to limit the use of impeachment evidence to witness
credibility, jurors seldom limit the application of such evidence only to those
areas directed by the court.'5 If use of suppression hearing testimony by the
state confuses or misleads jurors, allowing them to speculate what effect im-
peachment evidence has on direct evidence of guilt, improper convictions could
occur. Such results will render meaningless the doctrine established in Sim-
mons to protect defendants 55 (and apparently supported by the Burger Court
in Salvucc).'"6 The important state policy of promoting truthful testimony
at all stages of the adjudicatory process can and should be served, but by
bringing a separate prosecution for perjury, not by convicting an innocent
defendant.
Placement on the Constitutional Continuum
As in cases like Garrity v. New Jersey,'" Spevack v. Klein,' s and New
Jersey v. Portash,'19 a defendant in the Salvucci dilemma has a choice be-
includes delivery of controlled substances) is a class B felony, id. § 35-48-4-2, punishable by
a fixed term of ten years, id. § 35-50-2-5, with up to ten years for aggravating circumstances,
id. § 35-4.1-4-7, and a $10,000 fine. Dealing narcotics to someone eighteen years or younger
can be a class A felony, id. § 35-48-4-2, punishable by a fixed term of thirty years, id. § 35-50-2-4,
with up to twenty years more for aggravating circumstances, id. § 35-4.1-4-7.
152. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text, which discuss the state's interest in being
able to utilize suppression hearing testimony for impeachment purposes:
The . . . policy [of preventing fabricated testimony] . . . is the ancient rusty
weapon that has always been brandished to oppose any reform in the rules of
evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good argument
against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will
lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that
any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even
if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
5 J. WIGMORE ON EvDENC § 1477 (1974).
153. FED. R. Evr,. 403.
154. See supra note 149.
155. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
156. See 448 U.S. 83, 89-90, 93-94 (1980).
157. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
158. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
159. 440 U.S. 450 (1978). See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying test.
1984]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
tween two options-either of which harms him. If the defendant chooses to
testify at the suppression hearing in order to obtain standing and that testimony
can be used for impeachment purposes, the innocent defendant who testifies
falsely at the suppression hearing risks wrongly being found guilty when he
testifies truthfully but inconsistently at trial. If the defendant decides not to
testify at the suppression hearing and asserts his fifth amendment right to
protect against the consequences of testifying at the suppression hearing, he
then waives a fourth amendment right to suppress illegally obtained evidence
that will be incriminating when introduced at trial.
Whether this choice is as involuntary and constitutionally impermissible as
the choices made by defendants in such situations as found in Garrity, Spevack,
Portash, or Jones v. United States'60 and Simmons,'6 ' however, must also
be measured in terms of how necessary it is for a defendant to testify at a
suppression hearing to assert a fourth amendment violation. If the only alter-
native is to have the defendant testify to establish standing, the choice becomes
more akin to Portash, as suggested by Professor LaFave. 62 If the defendant's
testimony is not necessary to establish standing (more likely in the non-
possessory offense case), however, the choice becomes more akin to the volun-
tary choices made in People v. Coleman' and arguably as reasonable as the
choices made by defendants in Corbitt v. New Jersey'" and Stein v. New
York. 165
In non-possessory cases, because the defendant may not be the "aggrieved
party,"'' 66 the defendant's testimony may not be necessary to establish stand-
ing. In this situation, the defendant is not as compelled to testify at the sup-
pression motion as the defendant charged with a possessory offense. Also,
if suppression hearing testimony is used to impeach a defendant in a non-
possessory offense, the damage will be less severe compared to the effect im-
peachment would have on a defendant charged with a possessory offense.
As the nonpossessory defendant would not be testifying at the suppression
hearing to factors "the proof of which would tend, if indeed not be suffi-
cient, to convict him,"' '67 any misuse by the jury of such suppression hearing
testimony as a result of the defendant testifying inconsistently at trial will
not greatly prejudice the material elements of his case.
In possessory offense cases, however, the situation is quite different. Because
Salvucci'6 involved a possessory offense, the Supreme Court should have
analyzed the constitutional implications of the defendant's choice within this
context. In Portash, the Supreme Court decided that testimony given in the
160. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
161. 390 U.S. 377 (1967). See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
163. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975). See supra notes 95-103 and
accompanying text.
164. 439 U.S. 212 (1978). See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
165. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 9.
167. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960).
168. 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
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context of a grand jury subpoena is compelled testimony.'6 9 Although the
state does not force the defendant to testify in a suppression hearing (there
is no direct penalty for not testifying at a suppression motion), the cir-
cumstances surrounding the requirements of standing may require that he
testify. To be successful on a motion to suppress, the movant must establish
his standing and support his motion with enough evidence to meet the requisite
burden of proof."' For search and seizure violations, the best way to establish
standing to suppress certain evidence is to bring forth the aggrieved party.
In possession cases, therefore, the aggrieved party that must show standing
is likely to be a defendant in a given case.' 71
In this sense, the defendant charged with a possessory offense is compelled
to testify at the suppression motion; without his testimony there can be no
standing (given Salvucci's elimination of automatic standing), and the motion
would be denied. Just as a failure to testify at a grand jury hearing may result
in a penalty of contempt of court, the penalty for not testifying at a suppres-
sion motion may be the loss of a fourth amendment right. '7 On the other
hand, as discussed earlier,' 73 by testifying at the suppression hearing when
the testimony can be used to impeach the defendant at trial, the defendant
169. 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
171. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960). See also Slobogin, supra note 42. Slobogin
believes the Portash situation resembles the suppression hearing requirements under the fourth
amendment:
In the fourth amendment Portash situation, the defendant must talk, and perhaps
incriminate himself, in order to protect the fourth amendment rights to which he
is entitled. The defendant in a fifth amendment Harris situation, however, does
not have to talk in order to receive a constitutional benefit, and, in fact, is con-
stitutionally protected from punishment for remaining silent. In the first case, the
State is coercing, before trial, the generation of possibly incriminating informa-
tion; in the latter the State is explicitly required to prove that the confession is
voluntary before it can use the confession to impeach.
Id. at 398-99 n.118.
172. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Court was aware of the problems
in compelling a defendant to make a suppression motion, but allowing the evidence to be used
against him:
A defendant is "compelled" to testify in support of a motion to suppress only
in the sense that if he refrains from testimony he will have to forgo a benefit,
and testifying is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is
given to obtain a benefit. However, the assumption that underlies this reasoning
is that the defendant has a choice: he may refuse to testify and give up the benefit.
When this assumption is applied to a situation in which the "benefit" to be gained
is that afforded by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension
is created... In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.
Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added).
See also id. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black did not agree with the majority's
view regarding what is and is not compelled testimony. Black believed that "any threat of harm
or promise of benefit is sufficient to render a defendant's statements involuntary." Id. While
this language is even stronger than the majority's position, Black reached a different result because
he considered the privilege against self-incrimination waived when the defendant testifies at the
suppression hearing. Since the defendant waived his right by testifying, Black concludes, the
testimony is no longer compelled and the statements can be used against him. Id. at 398.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 148-56.
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risks being wrongfully found guilty of a crime he did not commit. This Note
concludes that by forcing a defendant to choose between testifying at a sup-
pression motion when charged with a possessory offense, thus exercising a
fourth amendment right, and protecting agaiist self-incrimination and possibly
being wrongfully found guilty, is constitutionally impermissible.
CONCLUSION
As a result of certain erroneous assumptions made by the Burger Court
and the elimination of automatic standing, the Court has underestimated the
prejudicial effect of using suppression hearing testimony for impeachment pur-
poses. United States v. Salvucci suggests that it is unclear whether the scope
of protections under Simmons v. United States is broad enough to protect
defendants from being impeached at trial by testimony presented by their
motion to suppress evidence. The Court should alleviate the current confu-
sion among the courts and deal decisively with this issue in a manner that
fulfills policies expounded by the Simmons rule, and prevents the possibility
of an innocent defendant being wrongfully found guilty of a crime he did
not commit. For guidance, the Court should look to analogous cases that
contend with impeachment issues as well as require an election between con-
stitutional rights. Analysis of constitutional choices defendants have been re-
quired to make in other contexts forms a continuum which can be used to
gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the various competing interests that
make certain defendant choices between constitutional rights reasonable, while
others are constitutionally impermissible.
MORGAN G. GRAHAm
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